[00:00] social media app the other day and somebody said,  "Hey, some things in the world are really getting   worse right now. What are some things that have  gotten better over the course of your lifetime?"   [00:15] And people came up with all kinds of really good  examples of things that have gotten better over   the course of their lifetimes. Airplanes and cars  — so much safer than they were a generation ago,   [00:28] at least for the people inside the cars. Speaking of inside, everywhere used to smell like   cigarettes all the time. You went to a restaurant,  you came home smelling like an ashtray. Speaking   [00:42] of restaurants, wow — restaurant food is so much  better than it was when I was a child. And I mean,   in aggregate. There's still lots of garbage  food out there. And I'm not saying that the   [00:56] very best restaurants of today are any better  than the very best restaurants of 40 years ago,   though I do think that that is probably true.  It's just that prepared foods, in general,   in the developed world, are miles ahead of where  they were when I got on the earth ride in 1982.   [01:13] And why is food generally so much better? Advances  in agricultural and food production technology   certainly play a role. Think about apples.  Unless you got a perfect apple right off a tree,   [01:29] most US apples just weren't that good until  the honey crisp revolution of the late 1990s.   Freezing technology, way better now. The whole  cold chain, in fact. Packaging advancements. I   [01:44] could go on and on in this thing that I've  written, but I'll try to get to the point.   I think the number one reason that food is  better now is globalization — globalization of   [01:56] information, significantly though not exclusively  via the internet. You used to have to know a guy   to know how New York pizza places made their  dough. Now you just go on a message board or   [02:09] watch a video. Globalization of people —  more movement, more immigration and travel   between farther flung places in the world, people  bringing and sharing their very different food,   [02:22] allowing for ideas to cross-pollinate. And of course, there's the globalization   of production and supply chains. If you ever need  a really simple way to explain how trade adds to   [02:37] the total supply of wealth in the world, just say  this to somebody. Say, "Look, imagine you and I,   imagine that we both had to cook all our own meals  from scratch every single day. I'm cooking three   [02:52] squares a day, you're cooking three squares  a day. That's six meals the two of us have to   make from scratch every single day. Now imagine I  knocked on your door and I said, 'Hey, how about I   [03:04] cook for both of us today, and then you cook for  both of us tomorrow, and while you're cooking,   I'll do something else productive. I'll mow both  our lawns. I'll go to work and I'll make money to   [03:18] buy groceries for the both of us, whatever.'" That's how trading between individuals makes   everyone richer, or at least it can. Now  imagine that happening on the scale of   [03:30] nations. Most of humanity was so, so desperately  poor, on the verge of starvation all the time,   until modern maritime trade. For many reasons,  significantly though not at all exclusively   [03:51] having to do with US elections, for many reasons,  the post World War II geopolitical and security   order that has enabled globalization is  breaking down, or at least that order is   [04:04] changing more rapidly than it has since, say,  the Soviet Union collapse during my childhood.   I remember watching cartoons one morning in August  of 1991 when my father shouted from upstairs,   [04:19] "You're watching cartoons while the world is  changing!" And I was like, "I'm nine! All I   know about Gorbachev is that he has pizza sauce on  his head! What's a coup?" Anyway, since that day,   [04:33] I have lived my life in "the long summer," the  Pax Americana, which was terrible for some people,   probably a net good for most people,  and absolutely fantastic for me, which   [04:51] is probably one reason I believe it was a net good  for most people, though that isn't the only reason   I believe it was a net good for most people. But  it doesn't matter anyway because it's over now.   We're entering a new geopolitical era, and like  all people who have ever lived through big change,   [05:10] we have no idea what's coming next. Change is not  always bad. Maybe things need to change. In fact,   I'm pretty sure that things need to change a  lot. But even if we presume it's positive change,   [05:29] the first steps on any journey of  self-improvement are always painful.   A lot of things are going to get worse  before they get better, if they get better,   though I do believe they will get better — it's  just a question of when and how and for whom.   [05:48] I talked on this channel a couple of weeks ago  about how beef is getting more expensive in the   US and there's really no particular reason  to expect it'll get much cheaper no matter   who wins the US midterm election on November  3rd — that's this coming Tuesday. I already   [06:06] voted. I voted early down at the old Knox County  Courthouse, which has a couple of cannons in   front of it. There were artillery barrages in and  around Knoxville, Tennessee, like 160 years ago,   [06:19] which is not that long ago in terms of the  things we're talking about. There was no   shelling that I noticed when I went to go vote, so  I suppose that puts some things into perspective.   [06:31] Sometimes you need cannon. But you definitely  want to vote right up until such time as you need   cannon. War is not the worst thing that can happen  to you any more than death is the worst thing that   [06:45] can happen to you. It is not the worst thing  that can happen to you, though certainly war is   one of the worst things that can happen. The food  gets a lot worse in war. So if you're in the US,   [07:00] I really do hope that you will join me in  voting. And if we succeed in voting for change,   whatever change means to you, there's a lot of  legitimate debate to be had there, but if by   [07:16] voting we are able to change the national course  at least a little, I hope that you will join me   in maintaining some realistic expectations. The systems that have given us our current   [07:32] level of security and material prosperity are  groaning under stress. And if you're poor,   you certainly don't need me to tell you that.  The rich are too rich. I'm too rich. That is my   [07:47] opinion. And I think that most people should  expect and indeed demand a bigger share of   the material wealth that their labor generates.  But I don't think that we can or should promise   [08:01] to make each other a lot richer anytime soon. Deglobalization and lots of other big things are   likely to make a lot of us poorer, at least for  a while and at least in some ways. Rather than   [08:18] wealth, what we can promise to each other maybe is  more power. We have to make ourselves feel like we   have more meaningful control over our individual  and collective destinies, hopefully by actually   [08:36] taking more control over our destinies. The wildly  irresponsible demagoguery of President Trump,   and many other politicians in the US and elsewhere  — that stuff works, it is appealing to people, not   [08:56] just because some of them hate their neighbors,  but also because they feel out of control.   "Yeah, this lying politician wants to be a  king. Yeah, these billionaires want to be an   [09:09] oligarchy. But there's a chance they may be on  my side. So my best play, maybe my only play,   is to gamble. Gamble on sports with my phone,  gamble on letting these neo-monarchists take   [09:29] more power, and then at least something might  get done." Yeah, buddy, a lot will get done,   but most of it won't be for you. And increasingly,  the choices will just get crazy, because everyone,   [09:49] you or me, everyone gets crazy when they have  levels of political or economic power that make   them really unaccountable to their community. What we need to be promising each other right now,   [10:04] I think, is not cheaper ground beef. We need  to be promising and delivering a project of   democratic renewal — small D, democratic.  We need to make the mechanisms of government   [10:18] and capital more responsive to the will of more  people. If we don't do that, if I don't do that,   [10:30] the people with the pitchforks know where  the big houses are, and I'm in one of them.   So what do we do in the next year or two to  reinvigorate democracy so that people don't   [10:48] give up on the idea of self-rule? What can we,  the people, watching and making this particular   YouTube video, do in the next couple years? Let's  ask the smartest person I know on such matters,   [11:05] the political and moral philosopher Vlad Vexler,  child of the Soviet Union, citizen of the UK,   which is having its own democratic crisis.  How are things over there, Vlad?   Vlad: They are similar across the West because   [11:21] we are being hit by waves that are of a global  nature. And that's bad news because it means you   can't opt out of them. But it's also good news  because some of the solutions to them are going   [11:35] to be overlapping and they're going to be things  that we can learn from one another because we're   Solutions such as? Vlad:   [11:48] This is painful as a question because, not most  humans, but some humans, in particular our type   of humans, humans who have experienced the  kind of recent past that we have experienced,   [12:04] tend to be hung up on the idea that even if  things get worse a little bit, they're going   to get overall better in the long run. And what's  happened is that we have consciously questioned   [12:20] that idea. We have said, well, look, Francis  Fukuyama wrote this very famous essay in 1989,   which became a book in 1992 talking about the  at least potential global convergence on a sort   [12:38] of democratic capitalist civilization. And consciously we have begun to question   that. But I think in our subconscious, or  unconscious, we're still attached to this idea   [12:52] that things must get better in the long run.  And this creates a problem for us because it   means that when we see certain trends that  are on a trajectory of irreversible decline,   [13:09] we tend to not cope with that and not be able to  accept that. Whereas in fact, there's a hell of a   lot we could do about it, right? Things could  get worse by 30%, to pull out a number out of   [13:22] thin air, if we do nothing. They could get  worse by 10% if we try to do something about   it. And every percentage point makes a difference  because it's individual lives that are involved.   This is the basic practical reality of politics  and why I don't believe in incrementalism at the   [13:41] level of policy, but I believe in incrementalism  at the level of understanding that making things   a little bit better actually transforms, or stops  transforming in the negative, individual lives. So   [13:54] there is quite a lot we can do. What I doubt, in  fact, what I'm certain we can't do is completely   blow our way out of our current historical moment  and return to some of the things that a lot of us   [14:09] might feel are kind of a version of normal. You might say that sort of lasted between 1989   and 2014. That, I think, is a past that's  gone, but I think that we are still going,   [14:22] and some of us haven't even begun to go, through  a period of grief about letting that go. And I   have quite a bit of optimism that we're going  to have more efficacious and less hopeless   [14:35] citizens once we've gone through that period of  grief, realizing that we can't have the past,   but we can make a hell of a big difference to  how the present goes. Because when I talk about   [14:48] certain irreversible trajectories, I don't mean  that something like the collapse of a democracy   is irreversible. All that's irreversible  is that there are certain social forces   out there that are making the sustenance of a  democracy, let's say, three times harder.   [15:04] those particular forces, the big ones? Vlad:   I think that the first thing we do is create a  box where we're even open to thinking about these   [15:17] things at all, because there's a part of us that  says, "Well, no, there aren't any such forces.   This is just about what people want and what they  vote for. And if we change enough people's minds,   But I think that the patterns of  extraordinary economic inequality   [15:34] and exclusion that you talked about in your  incredibly beautiful piece are a big part of it.   I think the untethering of social bonds is a very  big part of it — the fact that in progressively   [15:48] fewer and fewer ways, we actually share a society,  feel like we share a society with our fellow   citizens. We've also got very limited control.  We're trying to sort of do guerrilla warfare   [16:01] against the algorithms, you and I together, but  we've got very little control about the state   of the internet. We have got certain patterns  of alienation that are just to do with being   [16:14] in the modern world. There is something  about modernity that means, for instance,   that nobody can fully feel at home, no matter  where they are. So there are certain things   that are more civilizationally impactful here that  stretch not just decades, but a century or two.   [16:32] And we are spectacularly individualistic and  spectacularly consumerist in the way we think   of what a good life is. And it's very, very hard  to shift that. And the point is, this is just a   [16:47] box into which everybody watching should put their  own analysis because these are just clues to how   you fill that box up. And so the point is, you  can't create citizens who behave constructively,   [17:02] who feel good about themselves, unless you  change some of this social physics. The more   we change this social physics, to use a terribly  scientistic term, the more there'll be room   [17:16] for citizens to change their internal states. And one of these is the one that you talked about   a lot, which is this unbelievable, overwhelming  feeling of not having any control, this feeling   [17:29] that you can't touch politics, the feeling that  maybe some other people can touch it, but there's   nothing you can do that'll get you to even get  closer to being able to touch it. And that's an   [17:41] absolutely terrifying feeling because it's like  sitting in a car, turning the steering wheel   and there being no response. And that invites us  straight away into a kind of magical thinking.   [17:54] the car who has got a sort of magical solution to  this problem because we can't, at the level of the   sort of machinations of cause and effect available  to us, we can't enact any such solution." And so   [18:07] what's really dangerous is the control issue  you mentioned, but then the way it seeps into   essentially the desire to give up on making sense  of politics at all. "If I can't turn the wheel and   [18:22] make the wheels turn, then maybe none of this  makes any sense and I'm just going to sit here,   Yeah. To put those things into a couple of  specific examples that I see in the kind of   [18:37] things that I talk about on my channel — so, we  feel out of control of our bodies, not just people   who are chronically ill, such as yourself, Vald —  everyone kind of living in a physical world that   [18:49] is not the one for which our particular bodies  were evolved over thousands of years. And so we're   losing control of our diets and how they affect  our bodies and how we feel. And those are really,   [19:01] really enormous system-level things affecting  us. But if somebody comes along and says,   "Hey, if we just take out a few of these little  mysterious additives with funny names, which may   [19:14] indeed actually be bad for you, but probably are  not the big thing that is bad for you, but if we   take them out, then you're going to feel a whole  lot better." Some people really do believe that.   [19:27] I think a lot more people, especially people who  might be watching me, if they believe it at all,   it's just because they want to, because they don't  know what else to do. Or that your healthcare is   [19:43] getting completely unaffordable. We are in a  particularly bad situation with healthcare in   the United States where, among other things,  something like a third of every healthcare   dollar goes to private insurers, which is maybe  not where we want it to go. But at the same time,   [20:01] healthcare is getting more expensive everywhere,  for big-picture demographic and economic reasons.   It's not getting cheaper anywhere. No one  is going to be able to make it cheaper.   We can maybe stop it from getting way more  expensive than it otherwise would. But this is   [20:19] a situation of how fast are we digging ourselves  into the hole versus getting ourselves out of   the hole, at least for the foreseeable future. And so when somebody comes along and says, "Well,   [20:31] we just need to get the private insurers out of  the system, that will fix everything," I happen   to think that that would fix a lot of things, but  it wouldn't fix everything. And then some, in my   [20:45] view, much more irresponsible, much more magically  thinking thinkers come along and say, "No, what'll   really make healthcare affordable is if we get rid  of all of the undeserving others." Fraud is real,   [20:58] but it's not the big thing. The big thing is big  things that no one has a solution for. If they   did have a solution, they'd be pursuing it. They  don't. So instead, all they know how to do is to   [21:11] tell you something that you want to hear in order  to fuel their particular political entrepreneurial   Yeah. And it's very difficult to talk about  what you can and what you can't control as   [21:32] a politician addressing a citizenry. But I think  one thing we can do better is learn how to speak   to the whole country. Now, there are certain  things that are going to stop us from doing   [21:47] that quite as well as we would like. And the  fact that we're in these bubbles of distinct   fact and mental worlds as a consequence of social  media, that's going to be a really tough obstacle.   [22:00] But we can lean into values that bring citizens  together, like solidarity or the public good,   when we make the case for certain actions. Because  one of the things that's been very disappointing   [22:17] in what I call technocratic centrist politics  is that it's somewhat given away to making   very particularist arguments for very particular  issues. And it's a kind of justification that's   [22:32] only going to make sense to select groups. And what you end up with is presenting the   population with 777 different micro-justifications  for different things. And to most citizens,   [22:49] that just looks like a bag with random shit  in it. You can relate to maybe some of it,   but most of it is not dressed up for you  to be able to understand at the level of,   [23:03] "Why is this an important thing to do?" or, "Why  is it an important thing to stop doing?" So if I   were, for instance, and you mentioned my chronic  illness, if I were to advocate for my political   [23:15] cause as a patient with a chronic illness  that's not getting sufficient research, I   would lean into values like solidarity, a certain  kind of safety net for all citizens, values like,   [23:28] for goodness' sake, even economic productivity.  So much productivity is lost for people like me   being sick. I'm making the case on the basis of  things that other citizens already want to happen,   [23:41] already want to have more of in their society. Adam:   And not just appeal to people's sense of shame.  Because as we've maybe seen, not all of our   citizens have the same sense of shame that we do.  If you make me feel ashamed, it really, really,   [23:59] really works, right? But if you say to somebody  else, "Hey, you need to care about me because —   have you no shame, sir?" He might not. Vlad:   And different arguments also work with different  groups, but you've got to keep circling back to   [24:17] what captures the largest groups in society rather  than be like this. So what is still missing from   most not-irresponsible political actors in  the West is even an experimental version of   [24:39] a language that adequately tries to address  the whole country. It's one of the things the   Democrats in the United States, capital  D, still haven't learned as a party.   [24:55] Adam: Some of them are learning it, I think.   who are learning took on more central positions  in the party. But I think you're absolutely right.   [25:09] There are a lot of people who are breaking ground  in the way politics gets spoken about. And you've   seen this with Zohran Mamdani, and one of the  things that he is so good at doing is giving   [25:26] the perception of competent governance, which  is a difficult thing to do in our context. But   the way he speaks about what he does, funnily  enough, allows him to do more of what he does,   [25:40] because he makes a lot of people feel that  whether they agree with his policies or not,   that he's actually in the business of being  efficacious enough to get something over the   [25:54] line. That's very, very important. And it's not a  one-off. There's a few demonstrations like this,   but they're still few and far between. But there are demonstrations of the fact that   [26:07] the collapse of trust is not something that is  just sort of ubiquitously irreversible. You can   make inroads into it. You can do all kinds of  partial reversals. You can bring people back   [26:20] on board. And you can't do that, however, if  you are defensive, if you refuse to be bold,   and if your politics is about averting the worst  things that can happen and taking a kind of a   [26:37] precautionary, defensive stance. So there's  still too much of that going on with politics   all over the west. And it's understandable.  We can empathize with that, because you've   got Trumps sort of mushrooming all over the place  and that's very intimidating. But funnily enough,   [26:53] you perpetuate this kind of mushrooming by  taking a defensive position like this and   responding to what happens rather than leading,  both with your actions and with your words.   politicians performing action for action's sake,  the performance of action as an end unto itself,   [27:14] not necessarily as one that is actually coherently  connected to some kind of real cause and effect,   but just, "I'm doing something big, and that is  an end unto itself," is one of the core historical   [27:27] features of fascism, is it not? We can't just do  action for action's sake. If a bunch of Democrats   and other Trump opponents are elected in the  next couple of weeks here in the United States,   [27:41] and they find themselves controlling Congress  but not the presidency, and they make a great   show of action to counter the President that is  not meaningful — surely that can't be enough. And   [27:55] indeed, that could be part of the problem. Part  of the problem is that people know it's a show,   Yeah, you're completely right. And you're  right in two ways. First of all, action that   [28:09] is self-justifying is a very important facet of  that space of fascist ideology. And I don't think   that we are primarily floating about in fascist  politics when we talk about Trump or the AFD in   [28:26] Germany or Le Pen in France, but we're talking  about politics that has a strong fascisized   And it is certainly true that, the thought  that if you take a certain action emphatically   [28:41] enough and with enough virility, that it becomes  self-justifying, and that what you say about it   becomes true as well. And that's a terrible place  where we don't want to go. Another place, because   I think you're doubly right in what you said,  where we don't want to go is toward fabricating   [28:59] optimism. Now, under certain conditions that  are more peaceable and stable than ours,   that can sometimes be a good thing to do. Obama in  2008 thought that that was a good thing to do, and   [29:13] much of his message of change and hope was about  fabrication, which he thought was constructive to   And maybe he would have been right had he  been president 15 years earlier, but...   [29:28] Vlad: He would have been right had he been president   earlier, but we also need a bigger conversation  by Obama and by Bill Clinton about how their   [29:42] politics is connected with the rise of Trumpism.  They don't need to come out and say, "Oh my God,   I got every single thing wrong and it's my fault,"  but they need to begin making that connection. For   me, Obama, with all of his, again, recently  resurfaced brilliance, is not offering people   [30:00] to think along with them about that enough. But back to your really important challenge to me,   what I am saying is that it's 10:15 in the  morning, you've just accomplished something   [30:14] important, you can turn on your smartphone and you  can tell citizens, "Hey, this is what we've done.   By the way, this is what the rest of the day looks  like, and we're going to do our best getting these   [30:26] other things done that we want to move on today."  So it's very much about bringing people along   and showing them, and not just telling them,  about the efficacy that is genuinely there.   [30:40] And you're absolutely right. If we're not doing  that, if we are faking this, and we've in fact   achieved nothing at 10:15 in the morning, that  would be really, really worrying. It would be,   at least, that kind of inappropriate fabrication  of optimism. And at worst, it would be a kind of   [30:58] defensive co-option into the fascistized dance of  the very people we are politically most rightly   concerned about. So I agree. Adam:   Really quick checklist — things that my people  and I should be doing in the next couple of years.   [31:17] Demand big change. Don't just be satisfied with  people saying that they're going to let things go   Vote. Help other people to vote. Pick one or  two important political issues that you can   [31:34] get passionate about, on which you can try to  keep your political representatives accountable   by writing to them, by calling them and so  on. If you have the capacity, get involved   [31:46] in local politics. Even if it's something as  banal as talking about speed limits in your   town or talking about how many benches are going  to go up in the park. You're touching politics,   and not only touching politics, you're also  engaging with your neighbors who may not share   [32:05] your ideology, might not share your ideas about  the kind of people they want to see in power,   but you can still cooperate with them around local  issues, thereby building up trust all around.   [32:19] Also, don't underestimate, to make a  gastronomic point, the importance of   dinner table conversations, the importance of  inviting people into your home with whom you can   on everything politically, but you can bond on  other things, and also realize that it's not the   [32:38] end of the world if you disagree politically, that  you share a society, you could have constructive   conversations. Maybe one more thing I'd throw  in — support independent journalism. And also,   just psychologically, realize that the  best antidote to overwhelming despair   [32:56] is actually taking a little bit of action. Adam:   Vlad. These are things that were really hard for  me to absorb and accept from you. I didn't believe   [33:10] them at first, and then you persuaded me. OK? So  one would be, stop expecting to live in a society   [33:22] where everyone shares your morals. There is some  basic level of moral compatibility that you have   to accept and enforce. And if you leave that basic  threshold, then, well, the result is literally   [33:36] war, and sometimes war is necessary. But then you  have to have an honest conversation with yourself   keep them from killing you. So give up on the  idea that everyone is going to share your morals.   [33:51] Accept that politics exists downstream from  morality — indeed, that politics exists in large   measure to help people with different concepts  of morality coexist, possibly even cooperate,   [34:04] but at the very least coexist and not kill  each other. And that doesn't mean give up on   your moral outlook. Go hard, man. Stand for what  you believe in. But you can't just say, "I'm not   [34:17] going to work with all of these other people who  don't look at things the way that I do on a moral   level," because I don't get to decide who I share  my world with — unless I want to kill them. So   [34:29] that's one. It took a long time of you telling me  something like that, Vlad, for me to accept it.   Another related one, and it's very hard to hold  up nine fingers. Hey, let's do this. There we go,   [34:41] hey. So, a related one is what you touched  on earlier, Vlad, which is to advocate for   your interests, and the particular interests of  your community, primarily in terms of collective   [34:54] interest. The reason why you should join me in  advocating for the rights of my sexual or gender   minority is not because you care about me — it's  because it guarantees your right to live your own   damn life as you see fit. Those are terms in which  I have discussed the rights of trans people in my   [35:12] own work many times, and I've had trans folks,  some quite close to me in my life, say, "No,   it's not just enough [to talk] about freedom. It's  about actively guaranteeing people's rights and   wellbeing. You can't just say, 'Hey, live and let  live, man.' We need to actually do things to try   [35:30] to advance the rights of this community." And I agree 10-freaking-million percent. I   just don't think we need to — I think it's  counterproductive to talk like that most of   So what you say is, you reclaim, especially in US  political discourse, you reclaim freedom, liberty,   [35:47] right? That is the social message that wins today.  It's, "Mind ya business," right? "Focus on your   own damn self. Fix your own life before you stick  your nose into somebody else's." That is a message   [36:00] that appeals to lots of really, really different  kinds of people in this country with very   different concepts of sexual and gender morality,  to say nothing of other kinds of morality.   little things very quickly. Adam:   [36:14] One of the reasons I talk about this point  that you've emphasized now, about how you've   got to appeal for your claims and your rights  on the basis of values like solidarity, is that   [36:26] I'm so worried about the reversal of rights for  minority groups. I'm very concerned about rights   being rolled back over the next five to 10 years.  And that's partly why I'm so obsessed with telling   [36:40] the story that we need to change the discourse  about how we advocate for minority groups.   And just the second thing I want to say is that  it is one of the most democratic emotions to   [36:52] feel that you're in favor of something, and that  somebody else can be in favor of the same thing,   In fact, they can be in favor of the same thing  for reasons you don't even like that much,   [37:09] or you even find a little bit offensive. But the  question is, can you get onto the same train,   and travel in the direction of the same  destination, even though the purposes of   [37:22] your trip are different? And that is possible,  and that is what a lot of constructive conflict   resolution in a democracy actually looks like.  And that's a healthy thing to feel. And actually.   [37:34] you're going to get fewer people jumping onto the  train and in the direction you want if you insist   that they have to jump on for the reasons  that are yours, or not jump on at all.   Vlad, by going back to where we started. You were  talking about Francis Fukuyama and his argument   [37:54] that the entire world is converging on this  particularly US vision of liberal democracy and   lightly regulated market economics — as being  "the way," the final form into which we are   [38:14] metamorphosizing. And that was probably never  true, and maybe never should have even been true.   But I do want to assert that there is a good  reason, Vlad, to believe, or to expect, that   [38:30] overall things should get better over time and  not worse — not on the ground level, but in terms   of the arc of history, to use an overused phrase  because I can't think of anything better — that it   [38:45] ought to bend toward justice. We should expect  that over the long term things will get better,   for one very, very important and I think obvious  reason, which is the linear nature of time.   [38:58] We have the privilege of the past. We have the  benefit of accumulated knowledge, of knowing   what happens when you give too much power to  one person, that they always end up going nuts,   [39:13] and that's why kings are always mad, right? We  know that, because we have the magic of writing.   And even if we didn't have the magic of writing,  we have other modes of communicating information   across generations, of sending messages in bottles  to our future selves, to learn from our past   [39:30] mistakes. Shouldn't the benefit of the past be  enough to make it at least plausible that things   will get better over time? Vlad:   [39:42] I think, in the history of the West, there  are probably three answers to this. One   answer is the progressive answer that we could  associate with the early Fukuyama. And that   would roughly tell you that yes, there can be  four steps back, but eventually there are going   [39:58] to be five steps forward. So there's a kind of  teleological substance to history. In the end,   it'll curve in the positive direction. The second  view is also positive, but positive in the end.   [40:17] And that's the view of somebody like Marx or Hagel  or Engels. And that view says, Look, in our world,   no, we're screwed. We're going to have conflict.  We're going to have, just, calamities — left,   right and center. But eventually something  should click, and the new world that we can   [40:34] barely understand right now will come about.  And in that world, some of the conflicts and   challenges that are insuperable for us here,  today — actually, we will be able to transcend.   There'll be a start of a kind of a new humanity,  when it comes to how political life is lived.   [40:51] The third view, more associated with perhaps  Thucydides or Machiavelli or Nietzsche,   would be to say there is going to be progress  in the technical fields, there's going to be   progress in science, but there is no possibility  for accumulative progress in ethics and politics.   [41:10] There's no reason to think that, ethically and  politically, the world 300 years from now will   be better than the world 300 years before now.  These three sorts of streams of thought are very   [41:26] internally complex. There's a lot to pick from in  each, but I think that's roughly what we've got.   And I don't want to over-prejudice which side you  should take in these three. I do take one side,   [41:39] clearly. What I will say, though, is that  at the moment, the big risk for us is that,   unless we get our act together, the default  politics for the next couple of decades that we're   [41:54] looking at is a kind of electoral monarchy with  a big twist of might-is-right and fascistization.   If we do really, really, really, really, really  badly, and we don't do any of the things that we   [42:08] tried to begin talking about, then that's where,  for now, the drift of history is taking us. It's   taking us toward political systems that have  elections, but where the democratic process and   [42:22] the democratic culture is rather emaciated. And the ideology there is an ideology that   gives us the following picture:  Elections are really important,   [42:34] but they're not important because institutions  are important. In fact, elections are important   because they can confirm and reconfirm the  magical bond a leader has with the people...   [42:46] of this institutional fluff that needs to be  washed away. And the most extreme version of   this kind of politics that we can see today is,  possibly, Russia. But we have seen milder versions   [43:00] of it in countries like Hungary. And one of the  things Hungary has given us, only very recently,   is actually an example of a reversal of democratic  decline, which shows that even if there are all of   [43:14] these social forces that are making things harder,  they are never going to determine whether you lose   or keep your democracy, and they're never going  to determine whether you can actually improve   [43:26] So that is open-ended. It just means that  achieving that is harder than it was a   [43:38] couple of decades ago. But whatever view of  the three you take, my proposal is that we've   got to be concerned that, if we do nothing, the  natural drift is towards this kind of sort of   [43:53] emaciated electoral monarchy with a big twist of  might-is-right, and that's something we really   Thank you, Vlad. Vlad:   Thank you so, so much for having me.