AI Summary
DoubleLine CEO Jeffrey Gundlach discusses the current market turmoil, attributing it to peak AI mania and a deteriorating credit environment. He warns of rigged rating agencies, recommends defensive positioning with equal-weight S&P 500 and a barbell bond strategy, and expresses deep skepticism about private credit and AI-adjacent debt like Anthropic's.
Chapters
Markets were stable from April until about six or seven weeks ago, when the AI narrative started to show a darker side, signaling a turn.
SpaceX and Oracle received investment-grade ratings (BBB and BBB-) but trade like junk bonds, suggesting the system is rigged to allow insurance companies to buy them with favorable capital treatment.
National debt surpassed $40 trillion in August and is now at $40.6 trillion, running a ~$3 trillion deficit, pushing interest rates higher.
Gundlach avoids cap-weighted indices due to concentration in AI; he prefers equal-weight S&P 500, which is up 14% YTD vs Nasdaq's 5%.
Rates are still too low; he recommends a barbell: half in ultra-safe bonds (no corporate/ex-US), half in local currency EM debt, which is outperforming.
Investors should hold at least 20% in real assets: 15% in Bloomberg Commodity Index and 5% in gold, with a strategy to shift 1% per $100 gold decline below $4,000.
CAPE ratio at 42.04 implies negative real returns over 10 years; he won't buy stocks until S&P 500 PE is below 15.
Rates could head towards 6% on the 30-year Treasury, but government intervention like Operation Twist is possible, creating a conundrum.
Gundlach would not touch Anthropic debt; if it gets investment grade, the agency should be investigated because it doesn't deserve it.
Private credit is being jammed into insurance portfolios via arbitrage; markdowns like 100 to 77 in one quarter reveal systemic problems.
Gundlach advises defensive positioning: low equity exposure, equal-weight indices, safe bonds, and real assets, while warning of a potential credit crisis in private markets.
Mentioned in this Video
💡 Key Takeaways
Emotional Memory of Cycles
Gundlach uses emotional memory, not just numbers, to sense market peaks, a unique insight.
01:07Rigged Ratings for Insurance
Explains how investment-grade ratings are used to let insurance companies buy risky debt, a systemic flaw.
04:10Equal-Weight Outperformance
Equal-weight S&P 500 up 14% vs Nasdaq 5% YTD, showing the value of avoiding concentration.
08:27CAPE Ratio Warning
CAPE at 42 implies negative forward returns, a strong valuation signal.
14:43Private Credit Echo of 2006
Draws parallels to pre-GFC CLO practices, warning of a potential crisis.
27:42Full Transcript
[00:01] continuing its coverage and I am super excited to welcome in my next guest. Uh talked to him in a little bit, but I'm pumped to talk all things investing with DoubleLine CEO Jeffrey Gundlach. Jeffrey, good to see you. Uh it's been a
[00:15] >> It has. Yeah, no problem. I'm happy to do it. >> Um maybe we just start on what you're seeing in markets right now. Uh things were going well going pretty
[00:28] and a half and then boom. I mean, we're getting a major tech sell off here. We're getting continued convulsions in the bond market. How do you see things? >> Well, we had a very stable markets from
[00:42] about April until uh about six or seven weeks ago. And what started to happen is starting in June, July period, I started to talk
[00:54] to my investment team and say uh based upon my emotional memory of past cycles, which is one of the skills that uh is business. You don't just remember the numbers. You remember how it felt.
[01:07] And a lot of people uh can't really relate to that, but it's been a big part of my career. I noticed in June and July that it felt I noticed in June and July that it felt like we were at peak AI mania
[01:19] uh enthusiasm. You get these new technologies and everyone looks at the are potential benefits from them and they that's all they focus on. And you go into these very very high
[01:32] momentum periods. And then something happens where somehow the narrative starts to show a little bit of a dark side to it. So for about a couple of years, I would say the AI narrative was full optimism.
[01:46] It was this is going to uh transform every everybody's life. You're going to every everybody's life. You're going to retire uh on the basics of AI on the shores of Tahiti. And AI is going to have you living in of luxury, sort of
[02:01] like amazingly the movie Wall-E anticipated everybody. But then suddenly in June July the narrative started to take a darker turn with hey it might take your job
[02:14] and you might not have any livelihood and be forced to live off of off of some sort of stipend. And then that wasn't enough to really shake things up but it it signaled a turn and then we started to see massive
[02:30] turn and then we started to see massive issuance characterized the market at least after the early sell off in the
[02:43] to start to to shift based upon a lot of the issuance of some of this debt and more than anything the fact that the more than anything the fact that the ratings on a lot of the prominent AI
[02:59] ratings on a lot of the prominent AI adjacent or AI debt were clearly bogus. So we started to get into a situation that began to look like not totally robust lending practices and what I mean by that is SpaceX came out
[03:13] at a triple B rating and people were really surprised that they shortly after IPOing they put out a significant amount of debt issuance and they didn't
[03:25] which is the rating that was on them. They instantly traded like junk bonds and they continue to have a triple B rating but they're trading like junk these was Oracle which came out with a running
[03:41] a rating that kind of stunned seasoned analysts in the fixed income market. It got a triple B minus rating and there's no way that Oracle should say that with confidence because it's trading right now and it traded very
[03:56] trading right now and it traded very shortly after its its its debt issuance. It's trading like a single B minus credit in terms of its spread. So why it? Well, I think it's for the same reason that SpaceX does, and that is it
[04:10] seems that the system is being rigged to have investment grade ratings on bonds that don't deserve them. And why would they do that? Well, it's so insurance companies can buy them with very favorable capital treatment. So what it
[04:25] does is Oracle being a single B minus type of credit, but trading an investment grade credit, it means that insurance companies that are typically owned by private credit companies, which are owned by private equity companies,
[04:38] holdings in ways that might potentially be unhealthy. Sort of like the reason that investment grade that ratings based leverage paradigms are in place is so you can
[04:52] from themselves. You know, you don't want them to overly leverage, you don't want them to run into potential financial trouble. And yet there's now a system in place where they're able to do it if they choose to. So the system was
[05:05] designed to save them from their own excessive risk taking, but they found a workaround through these rating agencies. So many of these securities are only rated by one rating agency. It's it's
[05:18] by one rating agency. It's it's reminiscent of 2000 preserved. And so we started to see a less calm market in junk bonds and
[05:31] bank loans where the triple C category is suffering mightily. I mean, we're talking about we're talking about yields that are like 1,200 over on triple C rated bank loans. And we're starting to see ratings sorry, yield spreads widen
[05:46] pretty much everywhere, although it's largely contained as it always starts out to be to the lowest tiers of the market. So the triple C's have widened out. We're starting to see certain emerging markets widening out. We're
[05:59] seeing seeing just about everything starting to widen out in in the credit market, which is a signal that kind of corroborates the fact that the aura of of invincibility where we were in June and July on credit markets and
[06:15] equity markets alike uh is is definitely starting to crack. And a lot of this has to do with the amount of government debt, which of course everybody knows we went above $40 trillion on the national debt
[06:29] um back in August. I think it was around August 18th. And in in the 11 or so weeks since then, we've accelerated the the borrowing. We're now at $40.6 trillion just a couple short months later on the national debt. So we're
[06:43] running at about $3 trillion deficit right now. Fiscal 2026 ended September 30th and it was $2 of of of debt deficit. And now running, I don't know,
[06:58] maybe there's something idiosyncratic about the the last 11 weeks or so, but trillion national debt, which actually is over 8% So the problem with the government borrowing money is one thing that's
[07:15] pushed interest rates higher, but also now the excessive demand, seemingly insatiable demand from the, you know, the the the hyperscalers, AI and AI-adjacent companies. So what we've been really focusing on avoiding what
[07:30] I've been calling ever since about September, what I've been calling the blast radius of all of this where you don't want to own the S&P 500 on it. You don't want to own any uh cap-weighted index. You don't want to
[07:45] invest in an index fund that's cap-weighted because you're getting tremendous concentration about 60% you know of well depends what like half of the market is in this AI and AI-adjacent stuff. And of course
[08:00] we've seen significant deterioration in breadth breadth in the S&P 500 and stock markets broadly that before yesterday, which of course was a big drop in equity markets,
[08:14] something like nearly 60% of all the stocks in the S&P 500, six out of 10, >> Yeah. >> So the on a on a breath basis, we're already in a correction/
[08:27] a bear market. What I've been focusing on is just the opposite to get away from that that blast radius. I've been investing in equal-weighted S&P. So you get small doses of all of this AI
[08:40] stuff and you are owning companies that are already down a lot. And it's interesting that although this year has felt like a really good year for risk assets and equities, an equal-weighted S&P 500 has outperformed the Nasdaq
[08:54] year-to-date by a lot. Actually, the the Nasdaq's up about 5% only now year-to-date, and an equal-weighted S&P is up about 14%. So it's a very strong outperformance. And this is something that I rotated to
[09:09] in the aftermath of sensing the shift in you know, the dark side of of the mania starting to reveal itself. And I'm going to stay that way for a while. I'm I'm low in equities versus a historical weighting anyway. I'm only at 30%. And
[09:23] is equal-weighted S&P. I also like bonds, but I have a barbell idea in bonds. I I I think rates are still too low by my reckoning. I
[09:35] think nominal GDP is up around seven 6% or maybe even 6.5%, which is usually a starting point for where yields could be. And we haven't we haven't even made it above five and a half. So I think rates, given their own left to their own
[09:49] devices, they they may may move higher, particularly on the long end, which I've So I really I I I really recommend in bonds kind of a barbell approach where I take just about the lowest type of portfolio,
[10:03] one one that owns no corporate bonds, no ex-US bonds, just very very safe. And And I would put about half of the bond portfolio on that. And then barbell it it's something that's been a top performer. And that's local currency
[10:20] emerging market debt, which I recommend even for dollar based investors. In investors because emerging market currencies broadly have been outperforming the dollar. And the bonds have been outperforming
[10:33] domestic bonds. And so you get you get kind of a twofer. You get a higher yield and you get perhaps continued appreciation based upon the currency translation. I also believe that investors should have significant
[10:47] holdings in real assets, like at least 20%. And for those that don't, you know, can't deal in like real estate and like high value items, I would just recommend something like
[11:00] I recommended 15% in just like the Bloomberg Commodity Index and about 5% in gold. But when gold goes below 4,000, which it did, I've got kind of a calibration. What I want to do is I think gold will bottom out at worst at
[11:15] think gold will bottom out at worst at 3,500 from this decline from 5,500. So now that we're below we were below 4,000, my my strategy was that I recommended was every $100 that gold goes down, move 1% from the commodity
[11:29] goes down, move 1% from the commodity index to just XAU or the gold miners. And that way, if you get down to 3,500, you'd be 10% gold and 10% commodity index. So what's left is what I've been recommending all year, which is 20% in
[11:43] dry powder, which doesn't have to be T bills, but it it would should be in a relatively safe bond portfolio, hopefully avoiding again the blast radius of the AI problem, but low duration bond portfolios or what I my
[11:58] favorite thing actually is very high rated commercial mortgage backed securities that are low in duration. You can get a yield of about 6 and 1/2 with So I'm we're always looking for things that have what we call a high Sherman
[12:11] ratio. Sherman ratio is the yield divided by the duration, which gives you a very imprecise, but it's about the best proxy you can get for future risk-adjusted return. The yield, imperfect though it may be, is your best
[12:24] duration is a very strong proxy for volatility, at least relative to and a half yield with a two duration, you have a Sherman ratio that's over which means you'll be just fine if interest rates go up 100 basis points.
[12:38] You'll >> Sure. basis points, and you're also getting about 250 basis points over SOFR. So
[12:52] you're in a good spot there. So that that puts together a fairly low risk mix of things and lets you sleep at night as we deal with the the unwinding aspects of of the risk markets that really got way ahead of themselves.
[13:06] you're definitely the right person to ask. Do you are you how concerned are you about hyper scalar debt defaults? And if you are concerned,
[13:19] do sound like that could be a possibility. How much further do tech possibility. How much further do tech stocks have to fall from current levels? they've fallen so much in just the last month, it's really hard to say. I mean,
[13:33] you've got you know, Nvidia's in a bear market if you use the 20% drawdown. All all kinds of places of the market are are down in either correction territory. But I I wouldn't really be interested until we got into
[13:46] environment that's really kind of abject fear. I I don't think yesterday scared too many people, even though it was a pretty shocking down day. It looked like it was margin calls to me. The market didn't really fall
[13:59] until it opened. So it didn't start overseas. What happened is I I think that the some levels got hit on highly leveraged portfolios and they all they got blown out. And we're going to see a lot of reporting, I think, in the in the
[14:13] weeks ahead on damage that was done and perhaps bankruptcies. But I think I think that that this will take longer this is why I recommend only 30% in equities and basically one of the most
[14:29] low risk ways to to approach equities. I'll be interested in equities when the PE on the S&P 500 well call me when it's below 15. You know, I'm not really interested where it is. The CAPE ratio back at the
[14:43] was actually the CAPE ratio of the S&P 500 was at 50 sorry, 42.04. That's a level that if you map it off versus history, you have never had a real rate of return 10 years looking forward, a real rate of return that was
[14:59] positive. In fact, even above 35 you have almost no instances of the forward long term. I'm not interested in buying stocks when the forward looking return is negative on a real basis. And since Kevin Warsh insists that he's going to
[15:15] get inflation down to 2%, since the real return on a 10 year forward basis from this 42 level of the CAPE ratio was typically negative 6 to negative 8, return as well based upon these levels as a as a at
[15:29] least a possibility. In fact, history would suggest it's a strong possibility I just need things to be cheaper. I also think that bonds continue to be challenged, the long end of the bond market. If we
[15:43] don't have operation twist in a major way, the long end of the bond market needs to go to higher yields based upon GDP and the amount of issuance that's going on for long in long dated debt. So we've been
[15:55] actually completely out outside of the long end of the bond market pretty much all year. We were we're a little less out of the long market. We actually entered a little bit when the yields
[16:07] we're still significantly underweight in the long end of the bond market. Most legitimately can say they have a lot of experience in this business. By that I mean 15 to 20 years of experience in the bond market. They don't understand that
[16:22] 5% yields are not high. They've been living in a world of one to two and that three was some sort of a bargain for their entire career. And yet five doesn't make any kind of value sense when you have inflation that well
[16:38] pick an index. Three and a is is inflation three and a half? Well is inflation four? Well I use import export prices as what I think are the best inflation measures. Yes they have a kind of a quirky mix shift that happens
[16:52] depending upon well you know the the construct of imports and exports. But if you take but they don't have any adjustments. There's hedonic adjustments or anything like
[17:04] this. It's just prices. And unfortunately import and export prices if you average them together are rising 10% year over year. So there's a very high inflation rate being signaled from the export import
[17:17] prices. And of course inflation appears to be trending up again uh based upon the commodities and the you know the gas prices are down about 50 cents a gallon But they're still well I'm in California. We're still at $6.50 a
[17:31] gallon for for gas, you know. And and diesel in parts of California is at $9.99 a gallon because the pumps don't have four digits on more than three digits on them. So it's $9.99. So somebody's going
[17:46] to have to invent a gas pump or change change the the the gear mechanism so by the gallon. So that way you could get it up to 40 you could at least you could at least accommodate $40 a gallon for
[17:59] diesel because I I don't think I I don't think 10 is going to be the the ceiling >> Again [laughter] you make a good point. Maybe I should be the one that invented pump. But against that backdrop like where do
[18:13] But against that backdrop like where do you think the 10 year goes from here? a free market pricing would be higher. I would think that uh rates could easily head towards 6% on the 30-year Treasury, which would
[18:28] probably mean somewhere in the high fives on the 10-year Treasury, but I've noodling around with this for a long time, that there is a level where the government will suppress yields. And it's been made clear by
[18:41] Scott Bessent that Operation Twist is on the table. Uh they're not doing very much of it, but they're they're getting the they're just testing the system, the if they really wanted to, they could make rates whatever they wanted them to
[18:54] decades. And then but but that's the real conundrum for bond investing. I think the path of least resistance in a free market framework is higher yields on the long end, but yet the government
[19:08] realizes the interest expense problem is very dangerous. You know, with with with this kind of a deficit going up with the interest expense going to be you know, in the heading towards $2 trillion
[19:23] that that's the whole that that's the whole budget deficit for fiscal 2026. So long end, and I think that the inflation problem is is not going to go away very
[19:35] quickly. The commodity prices are too high, and the the effects of elevated crude oil prices, meaning $100 or higher, $100 ish or higher, they're They're going to hit their you know, fertilizer prices are going to continue
[19:51] to be very prohibitive, which will create a shortage in yields from farmers fertilizer. And there's going to be shortages relative to, say, 3 years ago in terms of supply. And that's also true of chemicals like sulfur and very high
[20:08] high price, high high quality, high tech lubricants for for machinery. I I just think this this problem is is not going to go away. So that's another driver for Unfortunately, bonds have been in a bear market now. We're coming on seven years.
[20:24] You know, it started really in 2020 was the low in yields. At that time I said, bond bull market. And usually for some crazy historical quirk, bond market cycles
[20:37] last about 40 years. So we went from about 1945 after World War II and rates were suppressed then. They were doing yield curve control to control the interest expense on the war debt. And they basically stayed in a
[20:50] bear market until about 1985. And then we we went into the this when we were in bear market till 19 1985 and then we went into a bull market which ended in 2020. So right now we're in a in a bond market
[21:04] where returns are kind of non-existent. We have all these strategies that we started at DoubleLine, you know, almost 17 years ago and we've got like 35 of different start dates. We started we roll about three out every year.
[21:18] And it's amazing how you look at some of these trailing results and we've outperformed most of our strategies, which is nice, but you get a return of like 3% and you think, wow, that's not very good, you
[21:31] know, per annum. But then you look at the benchmark and in if you're using the global bond market, you look at for like a 12-year time period, the the benchmark return is zero. There's just
[21:47] a secular bear market, which is where I think we are, but you have to do the best you can. And so that's so we look for for ways of making money. And we have strategies that are quite
[22:00] esoteric, closed-end funds in particular where we have leverage and all, but you it's closed-end. Those those types of funds have done in that environment more like about a 6% rate of return, which at least is better than the inflation rate.
[22:14] >> Jeffrey, would you own debt in Anthropic? >> Absolutely not. I I I I wouldn't touch it. I I wouldn't touch Anthropic debt
[22:27] until you know, the time to think about when a bond might start to be attractive, even though there's a lot of hair on it, is when it's no longer quoted on spread. When it's trading simply on dollar
[22:39] price. Nobody talks about the spread anymore. yet. Anthropic trades Well, Anthropic doesn't have doesn't have the kind of visibility, but I'm talking about
[22:52] companies like that. Um, Anthropic is angling for an I think that if they get investment gives it to them should be investigated because there's no way that they deserve
[23:06] an investment grade rating. So I think if it comes out at at the well, the motivation for getting an investment grade rating is so that can buy them and take on risk that's inappropriate
[23:21] for them because they're arbitraging rating agencies. There's now seven or eight rating agencies that rate corporate debt. There used to be three. showed up uh right
[23:33] crisis and ironically Fitch was the best one. S&P and Moody's failed miserably on the ratings prior to the global financial crisis and Fitch also failed to a certain extent,
[23:46] but they did a much better job. But now there's like seven or eight of them. there's like seven or eight of them. And a lot of these There are extremely suspicious activities going on where they have very
[24:01] small staffs and yet they're rating thousands of deals per year and you it just doesn't make any sense. These You can't rate thousands of deals per year with a staff of 25 people. There's The documents are like 200 pages. So I
[24:15] think I hate to be kind of kind of harsh about this, but I but it's always the case when you have a booming market, there get to be bad actors that show up to cash in on it. And I think some of these companies with
[24:29] list for a rating. >> Sure. say, what rating do you want? You know, if you want investment grade, you're going to have to pay for it. And I think that's been going on relative to the
[24:41] private credit market and the insurance companies through which that are forced that that they're told to buy. This reminds me a lot again of 2006 where I was in the structured finance business. We had been doing CLOs,
[24:58] CDOs they called them then, but we start we were doing them in the in the late '90s and then into the 2000s. And then all of a sudden nobody wanted to do And I went and met with the number one underwriter. I met with the head guy.
[25:11] But he was this number two position at the entire massive firm. And he said his biggest mistake was he wasn't issuing enough CLOs. sheet and he wanted to go from 25 billion of issuance to 50 billion. And I
[25:26] said, great, we'd love to do some business with you. And so I was in here in California and the entire CDO team from that firm was out for a conference down in San Diego. And so they took it they came by Los Angeles and we went out
[25:40] And I was sitting right next to the head guy. He was the number one issuer of CLOs in in the entire industry. And I said, what is going on here? We used to well. We you're doing all of these you're the
[25:55] we doing any deals? And he just looked at me and just matter of factly said, at me and just matter of factly said, we're never going to do a deal with you.
[26:08] with startups. And I said, that doesn't sound like a good sales point. I've got someone that's has never done this before. And he said, well, it's really pretty simple. You won't buy what we tell you to.
[26:21] The startup managers will buy whatever we tell them to because we're you know, we're putting them in business. And so they buy they're basically cleaning out their garbage inventory and dumping it into these first time managers. He said,
[26:34] and by the way, they also charge less than you. So we got a twofer. We get rid of our garbage inventory and we have to pay them less. So I went back to New York a few months later and I met with that same head guy, the $50 billion
[26:46] uh aspirational balance sheet guy, and I said, you've got a real problem on your hands here. You're on the on the road to ruin. Your CLO team is going to blow up your firm. And he acted completely unperturbed. It was like he wasn't even
[27:00] And I just left thinking, what what is going on? Well, I found out what was going on. That man resigned three days later after being paid a $250 million for the prior year and went off to his
[27:15] so that he couldn't he couldn't be held accountable. So that's what happens when you things get off the rails. And I feel like that's what's going on inside this private equity, owns private credit, owns an insurance company. It's all
[27:29] owned by the private equity firm and the insurance company has to buy what they're told. It's really rather a direct uh it's a really direct echo of what the story I just told about the CLO times.
[27:42] So I'm I'm very wary of all this debt that is being uh arbitrage using these these iffy rating agencies and being jammed into insurance company portfolios. That's what I'm really worried about is is these insurance
[27:56] companies I don't think are are sound. We already we've already seen some scandals coming up with, you know, some major players that said they had 3% turned out to be 40% and oops, you know, it was a it was a
[28:11] calculation error. You know, three, it's really 40. Well, that's clear evidence that you're in what I call the Wild West where you had you had a nice town on the frontier and it was all God-fearing agrarian
[28:24] people living off the land. There were hard there was there was hardly any crime, maybe a murder of passion now and then, but nobody even locked their door. And you got that sheriff like Gary Cooper and and uh high noon. He's got a
[28:36] heart of gold and keep everything under control. And everything's fine until something happens. And that something in this analogy would be that maybe they find gold two miles away from the town and in come all all these
[28:49] opportunists, fat spuck artists, rogues and rapscallions looking to make a quick buck and get out. And suddenly there's crime all over the place. Not only is you know, not only do they lock their door, they
[29:03] have to barricade their door because the whole place has gone to hell. That's what happens in financial markets when something new comes out and captures everybody's imagination and works. So it attracts more people to come in. That's
[29:16] what happened in the global financial crisis with subprime and that's what's happening with private credit and private and private equity right now. think this is this is going to be the story. And
[29:29] story. And once once the defaults start happening, it's going to be a big deal. I mean, it was about a year ago, Brian, when it was one day out of nowhere, one of the largest firms in the entire industry
[29:42] marked down uh one of their one of their private credits pools from 100 to 82 overnight. Year end 2025 was at 100 and in January of this year, they marked it down to to
[29:56] And then by the end of the quarter, it was marked down further to 77. So down 23 points. Now what people that aren't bond people, they they hear down 23% and they think,
[30:11] they they hear down 23% and they think, well, that's no big deal. I mean, Nvidia situation. This is a large portfolio of hundreds if not thousands of loans. And
[30:25] uncorrelated. So they're not supposed to all drop at once. And I'm sure they didn't all drop exactly 23 points. Particularly because I keep reading in the newspapers that uh the sponsors of these private credit deals all say
[30:37] everything's fine. There's no red flags, there's no yellow flags. There's actually mostly green flags, which leads me to wonder where the other piece is. There's zero red, zero yellow, and mostly green. So something's wrong with
[30:49] recounting anyway. But what is it? Is it half the loans are still money good at 100 and so the 23 points is only on 50% so they're down 46 points. Let's say you're the marketing person
[31:01] who's trying to explain this horrible result to your clients. Which which is better? They're all down 23 points, half are down 46 point, or a quarter are down >> Yeah. >> It's the math is the math. One of these
[31:16] things must be true or somewhere along that scale. So there's obviously problems going on and when you look at uh the public bond market, when you're
[31:28] looking at the the triple Cs or the C category, that's a pretty good proxy for what's in private credit portfolios. And the triple Cs uh in bank loans the the C right now. >> Mhm.
[31:42] >> So the the idea that some of these things are are holding up at par is is uh woman that I've been uh having she's a she's a big uh
[31:54] financial planner and she's got a lot of clients, really high net worth clients. And she talked to me about a month ago and she said one of her biggest clients has been in private credit for 14 years. >> Mhm.
[32:07] >> she says her distribution uh on average over those 14 years is 2% per annum. That's it. And there's a there's a uh there's an ETF that does tracks CLO equity.
[32:19] And its return for the past 14 years since it's been in existence is 1% per annum. That's it. That kind of shows you what the actual results are in markets that are transparent can be identified. So you keep hearing that the results are
[32:34] so great, but they're not. Uh the prices are substantially down and the honest the more honest sponsors are at least reflecting those markdowns. Many are, many are, you know, kind of resisting. Just going to hoping. I one
[32:47] resisting. Just going to hoping. I one told me And he said, well, we we keep them at par as long as we think we're going to get paid back a hun- So, you know, it it can look bad, but if
[33:02] that that that's how you get a thing that goes from 100 to to to eight to 77 finally had to throw in the towel. >> Yeah. >> So, I I think that this is a real problem and I want to be as far away
[33:14] from as I can get. So, I I the idea of buying entropic debt, it makes me want to break out in hives. >> Jeffrey, I got to leave it there. I will over the past decade of my career, I leave
[33:28] very much smarter about investing in the markets and I thank you for always making time for me. I really appreciate it.