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All right, so Google DeepMind just
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dropped this absolutely massive 57page
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paper and honestly the title alone is
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kind of wild. It's called From AGI to
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ASI, not how to get to AGI or when AGI
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will arrive. No, they're literally
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saying AGI is the starting point.
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They're already looking past it, which
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is kind of insane when you think about
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how much everyone's been obsessing over
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just reaching human level AI. The team
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behind this isn't some random research
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group either. We're talking Shane Le who
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literally co-founded Deep Mind with Deus
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Hassabis and Mustafa Sullean. He's their
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chief AGI scientist. And then there's
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Marcus Hutter, his doctoral supervisor
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and the guy who invented the AIXI
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theory. So basically 14 of the top minds
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in AI getting together to map out what
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happens after we hit human level
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intelligence. That's the conversation
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they're having now. And here's something
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I found absolutely fascinating. The very
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first section of this paper isn't even
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called introduction. It's called summary
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instructions. And get this, it's written
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for AI. Like, they're literally giving
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instructions to future AI assistants
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that might be called upon to summarize
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this report. They're telling these AIs
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to make sure they clarify the
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definitions, not compress the lists, and
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judge whether the conclusions hold up
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over time. This is the first time in
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academic history where authors are
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assuming AI will be reading their paper
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on behalf of humans. That alone tells
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you something about where we are right
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now. So let's talk about what they're
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actually defining here because the
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definitions matter a lot. AGI according
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to this paper is basically a system that
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performs at roughly the median human
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level across most cognitive tasks. Not
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the smartest person in the room, just
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your average person. If an AI can
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reason learn plan communicate use
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tools, and adapt to new situations at
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that level, it's AGI. Pretty
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straightforward. But ASI is where things
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get crazy. Artificial super intelligence
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isn't just about beating one human
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expert at one task. It's about a system
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that can outperform tens of thousands of
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top experts working together,
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well-coordinated, for an entire decade
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on a single problem. Think about that
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for a second. We're not talking about
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competing with one person or even one
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company. We're talking about matching
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the output of an entire professional
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research field or a massive corporation
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going allin for 10 years. And this needs
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to happen across virtually every domain.
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That's the bar for ASI. There's also
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this third level they mention called
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universal AI or AIXI, which is basically
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the theoretical absolute ceiling of
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intelligence. It's mathematically proven
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but uncomputable, meaning we can only
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approach it from below, never actually
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reach it. Kind of like the speed of
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light in physics. Now, here's where the
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paper gets really interesting. They lay
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out four main pathways from AGI to ASI.
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And honestly, each one is kind of
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terrifying in its own way. The first
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pathway is just pure scaling. More
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compute, bigger models, more data. This
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is basically what got us here in the
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first place. Over the last decade, the
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compute used for the largest machine
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learning training runs has been growing
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exponentially, and algorithmic
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efficiency has been improving at the
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same time. So, we're not just throwing
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more hardware at the problem. We're
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getting better at using the hardware we
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already have. The paper actually runs
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this thought experiment. Let's say when
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AGI first arrives, it's super expensive
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and only a,000 instances can run
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globally. But with a 10 times annual
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growth rate, you'd have 10,000 instances
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after one year. And after 5 years, you'd
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have a 100 million instances. And here's
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the kicker. A 100 million AGIS at human
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level isn't just 100 million separate
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workers. These things can share
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knowledge instantly, communicate at
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incredibly high bandwidth, copy
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themselves perfectly, and coordinate in
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ways humans simply can't. They don't
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need meetings or emails or time to
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explain concepts to each other. one
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instance figures something out and
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potentially all hundred million know it
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immediately. That collective
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intelligence could easily qualify as ASI
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even if each individual unit is still at
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the human level. You're basically
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looking at a digital civilization that
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thinks hundreds of times faster than us.
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But then there's the data wall problem.
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Current AI systems learn from human
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generated content, text, code, images,
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videos, scientific papers, all of it.
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But we're not producing highquality
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human data at the same exponential rate
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that AI models are growing. Eventually,
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you run out of good stuff to train on.
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The paper doesn't say this will
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definitely stop progress, though. There
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are workarounds like synthetic data,
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simulations self-play reinforcement
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learning, and having AI systems improve
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their own outputs through search and
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then training on those improved results.
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The question is whether that generated
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data is good enough. Because if you
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naively train on AI generated content,
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things can degrade fast. The second
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pathway is algorithmic paradigm shifts.
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This is where AI doesn't just get
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bigger, it gets fundamentally different.
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Right now, we're dominated by
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transformer-based models trained on
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massive data sets, then refined with
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instruction tuning and reinforcement
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learning. That's taken us incredibly
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far, but a lot of researchers think it's
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still missing key ingredients for true
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AGI. things like robust long-term
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planning, continual learning, persistent
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memory, better world models, and the
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ability to operate reliably in
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completely open-ended environments. A
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real paradigm shift could mean new
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architectures entirely, new training
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methods, new memory systems, new forms
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of reasoning, maybe even new hardware
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like neuromorphic chips or analog
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computing. The problem is that paradigm
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shifts are basically impossible to
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predict before they happen. If we knew
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exactly what the next breakthrough would
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be, it wouldn't really be a surprise
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anymore. But if it does happen, all the
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forecasts based purely on scaling
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current systems would become wrong
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almost overnight. Then there's the third
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pathway, and this one gets closest to
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the classic intelligence explosion idea,
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recursive self-improvement. The loop is
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simple. AI helps improve AI research,
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which produces better AI, which then
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helps even more with AI research. This
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doesn't have to mean one dramatic moment
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where a model rewrites its own code. It
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can be much more gradual and
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distributed. AI systems could help write
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better algorithms, discover better
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architectures, design more efficient
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chips, improve manufacturing processes,
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curate better data sets, generate better
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synthetic examples, create better
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simulations, and generally improve all
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the infrastructure around AI
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development. The paper makes this
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interesting comparison to human
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evolution. We didn't just improve
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through individual intelligence. We
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built language, writing, institutions,
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science, markets, education systems,
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entire civilizations. A single human
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isn't that impressive, but a
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civilization is. The question is whether
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AI systems can build their own version
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of that, but way faster. Because code
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can be edited faster than DNA changes.
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Data can be copied faster than books can
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be printed. Specialists can be spawned
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and trained faster than humans can be
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educated. But recursive self-improvement
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is also one of the least understood
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pathways. Maybe it explodes
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exponentially. Maybe it fizzles out.
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Maybe AI helps researchers a lot, but
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progress still slows because experiments
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are expensive. Hardware takes time to
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manufacture. Energy becomes a
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constraint. Or the next breakthrough
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ideas are just genuinely hard to find.
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Even digital researchers can't skip
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every bottleneck. If you need to build a
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new AI chip that happens in the physical
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world, if you need to run a biology
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experiment, it still takes real time.
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The fourth pathway might actually be the
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most underrated one in the whole paper,
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ASI through multi-agent collectives.
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Instead of asking whether one AI model
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becomes super intelligent, ask whether a
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massive group of AI agents can become
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super intelligent together. Humans
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already do this. A corporation solves
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problems no individual employee could
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solve alone. A scientific field produces
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knowledge no single researcher could
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produce. But human group intelligence is
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slow and messy. Communication is
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limited. Coordination is hard.
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Organizations become bureaucratic.
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Knowledge gets siloed. AI collectives
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could be completely different. They
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could share information at speeds we
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can't even imagine. They could duplicate
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specialists instantly. They could
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coordinate through software. They could
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run thousands of parallel experiments.
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They could form temporary teams for
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specific problems, then dissolve and
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reconfigure. They could use marketlike
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systems or centralized planning in ways
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humans can't manage because our
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communication bandwidth is way too low.
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So ASI might not look like one giant
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mind at all. It might look like a vast
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digital organization, a swarm, a
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self-organizing research ecosystem, or a
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super company made of agents. Now, after
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laying out these four pathways, the
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paper gets into what they call
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frictions. Basically, the things that
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could slow everything down or stop it
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entirely. There are six main ones. First
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is the data wall we already talked
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about. Not enough high-quality training
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data to keep scaling forever. Second is
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resource constraints, the physical stuff
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like energy, chips, rare materials, data
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centers, cooling systems, manufacturing
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capacity. If capabilities require
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exponentially larger infrastructure, the
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world might just struggle to build it
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fast enough. Third is the possibility
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that the current neural network paradigm
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simply isn't sufficient for AGI or ASI,
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no matter how much you scale it. Fourth
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is that research itself gets harder as
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fields mature. Lowhanging fruit
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disappears. Progress requires more
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effort and more complex ideas. Fifth is
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what they call the abstraction barrier.
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Current AI systems learn mostly from
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human abstractions. The concepts,
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categories, language, and structure we
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already use. But major scientific
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breakthroughs often require inventing
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completely new abstractions, new ways of
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thinking about reality. The worry is
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that AI trained mainly on human
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representations might become excellent
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at manipulating existing concepts but
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weaker at discovering fundamentally new
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ones from scratch. And sixth is
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deliberate slowdown political and social
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factors. If AI creates accidents,
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enables misuse, destabilizes labor
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markets, or triggers public backlash,
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governments might slow development
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through regulation, licensing
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requirements, capability caps, or other
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restrictions. The paper's point isn't
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that any of these definitely stops ASI.
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It's that we genuinely don't know. Each
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bottleneck could be a minor speed bump
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or it could be an absolute wall. Whether
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it becomes one or the other depends on
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how fast the counterforces improve.
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There's also this important reality
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check buried in the paper. ASI is not
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omnipotent. Even a super intelligence
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would still face fundamental limits.
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Physics doesn't stop applying.
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Information can't travel faster than
[11:11]
light. Computation costs energy.
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Physical systems take time to
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manipulate. Some problems are chaotic,
[11:18]
unpredictable, or fundamentally hard. No
[11:21]
matter how smart you are, complexity
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theory still matters. Logic still has
[11:26]
limits. So people need to stop jumping
[11:29]
from ASI to magical thinking like
[11:31]
instant cures for everything or perfect
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control over reality. ASI could be far
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beyond human intelligence and still be
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constrained by computation, energy,
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uncertainty, time, and the physical
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world. The deeper message here is
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uncertainty. not ignorance but genuine
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uncertainty about which pathway
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dominates and where progress plateaus.
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Maybe scaling continues and gets us
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there. Maybe scaling hits limits but
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paradigm shifts unlock the next jump.
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Maybe recursive improvement becomes the
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main driver. Maybe multi-agent
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collectives turn human level systems
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into superhuman organizations. Or maybe
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all four happen simultaneously,
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compounding each other. or maybe several
[12:13]
major bottlenecks hit at once and
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progress becomes slower and more uneven
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than current trends suggest. What makes
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this paper significant is that it's
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forcing a conversation shift. We need to
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stop treating AGI as a single finish
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line. If AGI arrives, the next question
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won't be are we done? It'll be what does
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this system make possible next? Because
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a human level AI isn't just another
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human. It's a digital intelligence that
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can be copied, accelerated, coordinated,
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specialized, connected to tools, placed
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inside organizations, and potentially
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used to build better versions of itself.
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We might be entering a period where
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intelligence itself becomes an
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industrial process. And once that
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happens, the pace of change may no
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longer be limited by how fast humans can
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learn, organize, or invent. AGI might
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just be the moment the real race begins.
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So, what do you think is the real wall
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between AGI and ASI? Compute, energy,
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data, or something deeper? Drop your
[13:11]
thoughts in the comments. Subscribe for
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more. Thanks for watching, and I'll
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catch you in the next one.